Comment:  Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the Terry Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court\u27s Decision to Compel Identification by Stulin, Jamie L.
American University Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 5 Article 4
2005
Comment: Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The
Latest Expansion of the Terry Doctrine and the
Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court's
Decision to Compel Identification
Jamie L. Stulin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stulin, Jamie L. "Comment: Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the Terry Doctrine and the Silent Impact of
Terrorism on the Supreme Court's Decision to Compel Identification." American University Law Review 54, no.4 (2005): 1449-1483.
Comment: Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the
Terry Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court's
Decision to Compel Identification
This comment is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol54/iss5/4




DOES HIIBEL REDEFINE TERRY? THE 
LATEST EXPANSION OF THE TERRY 
DOCTRINE AND THE SILENT IMPACT OF 
TERRORISM ON THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DECISION TO COMPEL IDENTIFICATION 
JAMIE L. STULIN* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction .............................................................................................1450 
 I.   Background...................................................................................1454 
 A.   The Terry “Reasonable Suspicion” Standard ........................1454 
 B.   Terry’s Progeny .....................................................................1456 
 II.  The Current Controversy:  Hiibel’s Decision to  
  Compel Identification Compromises Terry and  
  Erodes Privacy Rights...................................................................1458 
 A.   “Stop and Identify” Statutes ..................................................1459 
 B.   What’s in a Name? The Breadth of  
  Computer Databases ..............................................................1460 
 1.   NCIC database .................................................................1460 
 2.   Other databases—MDT and MATRIX............................1461 




                                                 
 *  Note and Comment Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 55; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2006, American University, Washington College of Law; B.S., 2000, Tufts 
University.  Many thanks to Professor Elizabeth Boals for her expertise, Jessica Salsbury for 
her superb guidance, and the entire staff of the American University Law Review for its hard 
work on this piece.  Special thanks also to my family and friends, who have provided 
endless encouragement and support.      
STULIN OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:42:53 PM 
1450 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1449 
 D.   Hiibel Redefines Terry ..........................................................1463 
 1.  The court strays from long-standing  
  precedent, creating a new authority for  
  probable cause to arrest during a Terry stop....................1463 
2. Hiibel broadens the scope of a Terry stop  
  beyond the circumstances which justified it ....................1467 
 III.   The Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme  
  Court’s Decision to Compel Identification:   
  A Comparison to the Drug War ....................................................1471 
 A.   A Brief History:  The War on Drugs .....................................1471 
 B.   The Court’s Use of Drug War Discourse ..............................1473 
 C.   A Brief History:  The War on Terrorism...............................1476 
 D.   The Lack of Terrorism War Discourse in Hiibel...................1478 
    IV.  Recommendation..........................................................................1484 
Conclusion ...............................................................................................1485 
 
“Because it is my name!  Because I cannot have another in my life! . . . 
How may I live without my name?  I have given you my soul; leave me my 
name!” 
 —John Proctor, The Crucible1 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 21, 2004, five Supreme Court justices deemed a name, the 
subject of John Proctor’s famous parting lines, to be “so insignificant in the 
scheme of things” as not to warrant Fourth Amendment protection.2  The 
Court’s controversial opinion in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of 
Nevada3 held that a state can require a suspect to disclose his name during 
the course of a valid Terry stop, and that if the suspect refuses to answer, 
                                                 
 1. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE 143 (Penguin Books 1996) (1953).  This quote 
illustrates the value of a name; it led the play’s protagonist, John Proctor, to choose death 
rather than soil his reputation by making a false confession. 
 2. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 
2461 (2004) (deciding the case of a Nevada cattle rancher who challenged the 
constitutionality of the state’s “stop and identify” statute). 
 3. Id.  Newspaper editorials written in the week after the Court decided Hiibel 
demonstrate the controversial nature of the opinion and the strong viewpoints on either side 
of the debate.  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold a Nevada Law Requiring 
Citizens to Identify Themselves to the Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2004, at A16 (writing 
that the split 5-4 decision raises concerns about the boundaries of privacy); What’s in a 
Name?, WASH. POST, June 22, 2004, at A16 (warning that carving out exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment, even seemingly innocent ones, is a bad idea); What’s in a Name?  In 
the Supreme Court’s View, Not Enough to Matter, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 25, 
2004, at A18 (noting that the closeness of the Court’s vote is a reminder that Hiibel walks a 
fine line between individual privacy rights and the government’s interest in fighting crime).  
But see Name, Please:  Is That Too Much to Ask?, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 
24, 2004, at 6B (arguing that most Americans are willing to give up a minimal intrusion on 
privacy, such as providing their names when stopped by police, in exchange for security, 
especially in post-9/11 America). 
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law enforcement officials can arrest him.4  Specifically, the Court upheld 
Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute5 as constitutional, striking down a 
challenge that the law violated Fourth Amendment prohibitions against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.6  The majority also struck down a Fifth 
Amendment challenge to the statute,7 noting that “[a]nswering a request to 
disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to 
be incriminating only in unusual circumstances.”8  The majority reasoned 
that the request for identity has “an immediate relation to the purpose, 
rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop,”9 and is thus merely a 
“commonsense inquiry” rather than an attempt to circumvent the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments.10 
In validating the “stop and identify” statute, Hiibel moves Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment case law towards greater authority for the police and, in 
turn, towards a loss of privacy rights for individuals.11  Four justices 
dissented in light of this shift.12  Justice Stevens’ dissent suggests that the 
Nevada legislature, through its “stop and identify” statute, fully intended to 
give the state’s police officers “a useful law enforcement tool.”13  He points 
out that, despite the majority’s dismissal of a name’s significance,14 such 
                                                 
 4. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459-60 (emphasizing that the Nevada 
“stop and identify” statute is consistent with the Fourth Amendment). 
 5. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2003) (stipulating that a person who “willfully 
resists, delays or obstructs a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any 
legal duty of his office” will be punished for a misdemeanor if no dangerous weapon is 
used); see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2003) (defining the legal rights and duties of a 
police officer in the context of an investigative stop).  Under this statute, any officer may 
detain a person if he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person has 
committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.  Id. 
 6. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2460. See Brief for the Petitioner at 28, Hiibel, 
542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (arguing that an imposition of criminal sanctions for a suspect’s 
refusal to produce identification, when police demand identification without probable cause 
to believe an offense has been committed, violates individuals’ Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights). 
 7. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61. See Brief for the Petitioner at 17, 
Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (asserting that when a person is detained based only 
upon a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, compelled identification violates the 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination). 
 8. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 9. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 10. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459-60. 
 11. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Howrey Professor of Trial Advocacy, Litigation, and 
Professional Responsibility at the George Washington University Law School, Lecture 
Before the National Symposium for United States Court of Appeals Judges (Oct. 21, 2002), 
in The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
133, 134 (2003) (discussing the Court’s recent trend of augmenting police officers’ 
authority while curtailing Fourth Amendment protections of privacy and freedom from 
government intrusion). 
 12. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at __, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2464 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 14. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (discussing the majority’s holding that 
disclosing one’s name is not sufficient to constitute a Fifth Amendment violation). 
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information can provide a broad array of data about a person, particularly 
in the hands of an officer with access to state and federal law enforcement 
databases.15 
Moreover, with Hiibel, the Court continues its practice of manipulating 
the Terry rationale16 to reflect the needs of law enforcement officials at 
various points in history.17  For example, during the so-called “war on 
drugs” of the 1980s,18 the Court expanded Terry to allow officers to stop 
suspected drug couriers at airports and on buses, even though these 
individuals presented no safety threat to the police.19  However, while the 
Court has repeatedly loosened the requirements of the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard,20 it had not, until Hiibel, vacillated in its position that 
the scope of a Terry stop is limited.21 
In the 21st century, America’s focus has shifted to the “war on 
terrorism.”  Law enforcement officials now have the overwhelming burden 
of apprehending potential terrorists before another catastrophe like that of 
September 11, 2001 occurs.22  This Comment argues that although there 
was no mention of terrorism or September 11 in Hiibel, this backdrop 
likely played a role in the Justices’ decision to grant police the authority to 
                                                 
 15. See infra Part II.B (examining some of the law enforcement databases available to 
police officers and the information that these databases reveal). 
 16. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (creating a narrow exception to the Fourth 
Amendment that permits officers who can articulate a reasonable suspicion that a suspect 
may be armed and dangerous to conduct a limited stop and frisk of that suspect for their 
safety). 
 17. See infra Part I.B (discussing Terry’s progeny and the gradual loosening of the 
“reasonable suspicion” standard to give law enforcement officials the tools needed to fight 
the drug war); see also William J. Stuntz, Essay, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE 
L.J. 2137, 2153 (2002) (stating that in the roughly thirty years since Terry was decided, the 
Court has given police more leeway in street encounters in response to a sharp rise in urban 
crime rates). 
 18. See infra Part III.A (providing a brief history of the drug war). 
 19. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1980) (upholding a 
Terry stop in which drug enforcement administration officials approached a woman at an 
airport because she fit the profile of a drug courier, not because she presented a safety threat 
to the officers or the public); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989) (expanding the 
“reasonable suspicion” standard to include a “totality of the circumstances” approach, under 
which individual actions may be innocent, but when taken together they create a valid 
reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 195-98 
(2002) (validating police officers’ stop of two individuals on a bus and a search of their 
luggage, which revealed narcotics, because both passengers consented to the stop and 
subsequent frisk and were not coerced into complying). 
 20. See Elizabeth Ahern Wells, Warrantless Traffic Stops:  A Suspension of 
Constitutional Guarantees in Post September 11th America, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 899, 899 
(2003) (opining that the Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard has evolved into a virtual 
“green light for police officers, resulting in a complete disregard for personal security”). 
 21. 392 U.S. at 34-35 (White, J., concurring) (clarifying that a Terry interrogation must 
be brief, the suspect must be free to leave after a short period of time, and the suspect is free 
to decline to answer questions put to him by the police). 
 22. See infra Part III.C (delineating the history of the modern war on terrorism). 
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arrest and prosecute an individual for failing to give his name.23  While the 
information a name provides may aid police in detaining terrorists and 
keeping America safe, giving police the power to obtain it may narrow the 
already-diminished Fourth Amendment protections the Court held so dear 
in Terry.24  The decision to endorse this police power further raises the 
question of where the line is, and what aspect of privacy the Court may 
target next.25 
Part I of this Comment discusses Terry and its progeny, specifically 
addressing the “reasonable suspicion” standard and the scope of a Terry 
stop.  Part II sets out the Court’s precedent regarding “stop and identify” 
statues, and describes the Nevada statute at issue in Hiibel, as well as the 
information that a name can lead to with the use of computer databases.  
Part II then summarizes the facts of Hiibel and examines the Court’s 
reasoning, arguing that the decision represents a departure from long-
standing precedent against compelled identification and a redefinition of 
the principles articulated in Terry.  Part III provides a brief history of the 
war on drugs of the 1980s and the current-day war on terrorism.  It then 
compares the war on drugs’ impact on Supreme Court jurisprudence to the 
impact of terrorism on decisions made since September 11.  In discussing 
the analysis employed in Hiibel, Part III argues that the Court likely 
intended to give police officers broader powers to detain potential 
terrorists, although it consciously chose to omit any discussion of terrorism 
in its opinion. 
This Comment recommends that if the Court intends to expand police 
authority to reflect current events, such as the war on terrorism, it should at 
least reject bright line rules and limit the scope of that authority to stops 
related to terrorism.  Otherwise, the face of local policing will change and 
the erosion of the Fourth Amendment’s protections will continue. 
                                                 
 23. See infra Part III.C-D (analyzing Hiibel in light of the war on terrorism). 
 24. See infra Part III (examining the Court’s curtailment of Fourth Amendment 
protections as a result of the war on drugs and the war on terrorism).  Although Terry 
created an exception to the Fourth Amendment that gave police the authority to conduct an 
investigative stop based upon reasonable suspicion, the Court took great care to emphasize 
that the exception was very narrow and applied only to cases in which an officer believed 
criminal activity was afoot.  See 392 U.S. at 30 (providing a very specific articulation of the 
Terry doctrine). 
 25. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (querying 
whether the majority’s holding permits a state, in addition to compelling identification, to 
also require an answer to more probing questions such as “What’s your license number?” or 
“Where do you live?”); see also Michael C. Dorf, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Ruling on 
Giving ID to the Police, CNN.COM (June 24, 2004), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/24/dorf.police.id/index.html (last visited May 30, 2005) 
(on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that civil libertarians may have 
good cause to see Hiibel as the first step toward a national identification card system, which 
would undoubtedly sacrifice privacy). 
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I.   BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated.”26  Since the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment in 1791, the Supreme Court has carved out several narrow 
exceptions to the initial requirement that police obtain a warrant before 
executing a search and seizure.27  The most significant of these exceptions 
arose in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, decided in 1968 and still relied 
upon today.28 
A.   The Terry “Reasonable Suspicion” Standard 
Terry established that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the 
police from stopping a person for investigative purposes when they have a 
“reasonable suspicion” that the individual may be involved in criminal 
activity, even when that suspicion does not reach the level of probable 
cause necessary to make an arrest.29  In deciding the case, the Court 
engaged in a painstaking balancing analysis of government goals against 
privacy rights,30 and in the end focused on the government’s interest in 
                                                 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 27. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (creating the “reasonable suspicion” exception to 
the Fourth Amendment); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (articulating 
a “consent” exception to the Fourth Amendment); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 
(1990) (applying the “plain view” exception, under which an officer can seize evidence in 
plain view if its incriminating character is immediately apparent); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 
508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (adding a “plain feel” exception to the list). 
 28. 392 U.S. at 21-22; see infra Part I.A-B (discussing the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard and reviewing the evolution of that standard in subsequent cases). 
 29. 392 U.S. at 27.  Before Terry, the Court viewed the requirement of probable cause 
as the minimum justification necessary for police to make a reasonable seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.  See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (holding that 
custodial questioning cannot occur on less than probable cause).  It was a standard high 
enough to “safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and 
from unfounded charges of crime.”  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).  
Terry for the first time recognized an exception to this “long-prevailing standard.”  
Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 208-09. 
 30. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (adopting the balancing test set out in Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967), where  the Court evaluates the 
reasonableness of a particular police activity by weighing the government interest in the 
activity against the intrusion on individual rights that it entails).  For the Court to sanction a 
police activity that intrudes on individual rights, the police officer must be able to point to 
“specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  The Court pointed out that 
a lower standard would lead to invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights based on 
“nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches.”  Id. at 22.  It took the Terry Court 
almost seven pages to perform this balancing analysis, signaling the test’s importance 
whenever the Court seeks to create a new exception to the law.  Id. at 20-27.  Terry 
indicated that courts should perform a balancing analysis on a case-by-case basis, to 
determine whether the government interest sufficiently justifies an invasion of individual 
rights.  See 392 U.S. at 30 (concluding that Terry necessitates a fact-driven inquiry). 
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crime prevention and detection.31  It found that police should be given a 
“narrowly drawn authority” to stop a person and conduct a reasonable 
investigation,32 including a limited search for weapons, when an officer can 
list “specific and articulable facts” to suggest that criminal activity is 
afoot.33  The Court noted that in making this assessment, officers must 
judge the facts against an objective standard:  “would the facts available to 
the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”34    
In a concurrence designed to clarify parts of the majority opinion,35 
Justice White described  the scope of the interrogation that might occur 
during an investigatory Terry stop.36  While he conceded that nothing in the 
Constitution prevents the police from addressing questions to anyone on 
the street, he stressed that an individual who is stopped “is not obliged to 
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no 
basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for 
continued observation.”37  In so stating, Justice White attempted to 
highlight the boundaries of the Court’s decision, and hence to minimize its 
impact on Fourth Amendment protections.38 
                                                 
 31. See id. at 20-22 (citing the police need for a means of “swift action predicated upon 
the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and 
as a practical matter could not be, subject to the warrant procedure”).  The Court also 
focused on the safety of the officer, citing statistics that illustrate that a significant number 
of law enforcement officers are killed or assaulted in the line of duty.  Id. at 24.  This led the 
Court to conclude that an officer’s interest in assuring his or her safety is sufficiently 
important to justify a Terry frisk.  Id. at 24-27. 
 32. Id. at 27. 
 33. Id. at 21, 30.  The stop and the frisk, which equate to a Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure, are separate police acts that each require their own set of facts to meet the 
reasonable, articulable suspicion standard.  Id. at 27.  The Court described the frisk as a 
“carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
weapons” that might be used to assault the officer or a member of the public.  Id. at 30.  In a 
subsequent case, the Court clarified the boundaries of this protective search:   police cannot 
use it as a means of discovering evidence of a crime; rather, it is strictly limited to 
ascertaining whether the suspect has a weapon.  See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 
372-73 (1993) (suppressing the officer’s seizure of cocaine from a suspect’s jacket because 
the officer never believed that the lump he felt was a weapon).  Instead, he manipulated it 
until he realized it was contraband, thus exceeding the bounds of a valid Terry frisk.  Id. 
 34. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964)). 
 35. Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (writing an “additional word is in order concerning 
the matter of interrogation during an investigatory stop”).  Justice Harlan, in a separate 
concurrence, also felt obliged to “fill in a few gaps” in the Court’s opinion, acknowledging 
that Terry would likely serve as precedent for future decisions.  Id. at 31-32 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 36. Id. at 34-35 (White, J., concurring) (pointing out that a frisk by itself will serve 
Terry’s purpose of ascertaining if an individual is armed, regardless of whether or not a 
suspect responds to police questioning). 
 37. Id. at 34. 
 38. Id.  But see id. at 38-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (warning that the Terry decision 
will have an immense impact on the Fourth Amendment and takes “a long step down the 
totalitarian path,” watering down constitutional rights by giving police too much authority).  
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B.   Terry’s Progeny 
In creating a new breed of police investigative stops, Terry set forth a 
standard that proved relatively vague and became vulnerable to lower 
courts’ subjective interpretations.39  As a result, the Court has been called 
upon many times since 1968 to clarify its intent regarding the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard and the principles that Terry espoused.40  Factors the 
Court has considered in determining what constitutes permissible Terry 
stops include a suspect’s behavior patterns,41 the location of the stop,42 a 
suspect’s race,43 and the credibility of an anonymous tip.44  Even wholly 
                                                 
Justice Douglas argued that a loosening of the probable cause requirement for police 
seizures must take place through passage of a constitutional amendment and must be the 
will of the people, not the Court.  Id. at 38. 
 39. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (noting that lower courts 
have used a broad array of terms in attempting to describe what constitutes reasonable 
suspicion, such as “articulable reasons” and “founded suspicion,” none of which provide 
clear guidance that can be applied as a per se rule). 
 40. See generally Rachel Karen Laser, Comment, Unreasonable Suspicion:   Relying on 
Refusals to Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1995) (articulating that the 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is not self-
evident and has struggled to define it, ultimately deciding on a “totality of the 
circumstances” approach that defers to police discretion). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975) (holding 
for the first time that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining 
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1980) 
(upholding a stop based on drug enforcement agents’ observations that the defendant 
appeared nervous and engaged in behavior designed to evade detection); United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (validating a stop in which the defendant’s behavior 
exhibited all the classic aspects of a drug courier); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 
(2000) (finding that headlong flight is the ultimate act of evasion). 
 42. Compare Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 887 (declining to give any weight to the 
location of the stop), with Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972) (including a 
defendant’s presence in a high-crime area as one of the factors that led to the officers’ 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity), and Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (deciding that a 
location’s characteristics are relevant in the “totality of the circumstances” approach to 
determining if a situation is sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation). 
 43. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87 (holding that Mexican ancestry, standing 
alone, will not justify a Terry stop).  But see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES AND COMMENTARY 257 (7th ed. 2004) (explaining 
that race can be a relevant factor in the “reasonable suspicion” analysis if an officer has a 
specific description of a suspect that includes his race).  For example, if a bank teller 
describes a robber as an Asian male in his 40s who is wearing a red sweatshirt, an officer 
can limit his investigation to Asian males fitting this description.  Id.  For a general 
discussion of the practice of racial profiling, both before and after September 11, see Sharon 
L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 46-49 (2003) (arguing that the 
nation’s general opposition to racial profiling in Terry stops has shifted in light of the recent 
terrorist attacks against the United States). 
 44. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 (1969) (holding, in a 
gambling case, that police corroboration of innocent details is not sufficient to validate an 
anonymous tip); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (overruling Spinelli and 
adopting the informant-friendly “totality of the circumstances” approach); Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (following the holding of Gates in a case involving 
marijuana and cocaine).  But see Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (withdrawing 
slightly from the “totality of the circumstances” approach in a case that involves possession 
of a firearm, because apart from the tip, officers had no reason to suspect illegal conduct).  
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innocent factors, when taken together, may add up to reasonable suspicion 
in certain situations.45 
While the “reasonable suspicion” standard has continued to evolve with 
new fact patterns, the Court has held steadfast in its position that the scope 
of a Terry stop is limited:  the stop must be brief;46 the suspect must be free 
to leave after a short period of time;47 and, most importantly, the suspect is 
free to decline to answer questions.48  Until Hiibel, the Court had not 
drifted significantly from these restraints on the Terry doctrine in the thirty-
six years since it decided that case.49 
II.   THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY:   
HIIBEL’S DECISION TO COMPEL IDENTIFICATION  
COMPROMISES TERRY AND ERODES PRIVACY RIGHTS 
Hiibel forced the Supreme Court to finally take a stance on the 
constitutionality of state “stop and identify” statutes.50  In a line of cases 
that preceded Hiibel, the Court had invalidated most such statutes for 
vagueness, but quietly left the door open for a statute narrow enough to 
                                                 
See generally Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2138 (arguing that the law of criminal procedure 
varies in response to crime waves, and citing the Court’s treatment of confidential 
informants as an example that reflects the Court’s sensitivity to the drug war). 
 45. See, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10 (holding that although each of the defendant’s 
actions, by itself, was innocent, the totality of the circumstances were sufficient to provide 
the officer with reasonable suspicion of a drug crime); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 
266, 270-71 (2002) (involving the following set of factors:  the defendant drove a minivan, a 
type of vehicle often used by smugglers; the driver appeared stiff; he avoided looking at the 
police officer; the knees of the children in the backseat were unusually high; and the 
children were waving oddly at the officer).  The Court held that while each of these factors, 
taken alone, has an innocent explanation, when viewed in totality they were sufficient to 
justify the officer’s reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.  Id. at 277. 
 46. See infra note 47 (listing several cases holding that a Terry stop exceeded the 
original justification for the stop). 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (stating that an 
examination of whether a police detention lasted too long to be justified under Terry must 
include whether the officer diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) 
(emphasizing that the “investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop”); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-
10 (1983) (invalidating a stop that involved a ninety minute detention of defendant’s bag 
because it went beyond the police officer’s narrow authority to briefly detain luggage). 
 48. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (emphasizing that 
an individual detained based upon reasonable suspicion cannot be required to answer police 
questions). 
 49. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text (clarifying that although the Court 
has slowly expanded the Terry doctrine since 1968, only with Hiibel has the Court 
drastically altered its position regarding the scope of an officer’s authority during a Terry 
stop). 
 50. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 117, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 
2459 (2004) (stating for the first time that the principles of Terry allow a state to require a 
suspect to disclose his name during the course of a valid Terry stop). 
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pass constitutional muster.51  In deciding Hiibel and validating Nevada’s 
“stop and identify” statute, the Court set the standard by allowing officers 
to obtain a suspect’s name, but nothing more.52  However, with what it 
deemed an inconsequential decision, the Court departed from substantial 
precedent against compelled identification, and in turn redefined Terry on 
several levels.53 
First, Hiibel expands the scope of a Terry stop by allowing police to 
threaten arrest against those suspects who refuse to answer police 
questions.54  Second, and most importantly, Hiibel permits an investigative 
stop to go beyond the circumstances which justified it, a principal that was 
fundamental to the Court’s decision in Terry.55  Although the Court noted 
that its decision validates an officer’s request for a name only, the majority 
chose not to acknowledge that a name can lead to a host of additional 
information about a suspect.56  As a result, the case of one small-town 
cattle rancher from Nevada has redefined a doctrine that had been a pillar 
of the criminal justice system for over three decades. 
A.   “Stop and Identify” Statutes 
The Nevada law that Mr. Hiibel was charged with violating is called a 
“stop and identify” statute.57  Roughly twenty states have varying versions 
of such statutes, which generally permit an officer to ask or require a 
suspect to disclose his identity.58  In some states, a suspect’s refusal to 
                                                 
 51. See infra note 61 (discussing a number of cases in which the Court found state “stop 
and identify” statutes unconstitutional because they asked for identification in general, not 
for a name in particular).  The Court deemed this standard too vague because it gave police 
unlimited discretion in obtaining information.  See infra note 61. 
 52. See 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2457 (interpreting Nevada’s “stop and identify” 
statute to require a suspect to either state his name or communicate it to the officer by other 
means, as the suspect sees fit, but noting that the statute does not require a suspect to hand 
over his driver’s license or other documents). 
 53. Infra Part II.D. 
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 107-110 (observing that the Court signaled its 
departure from Terry by allowing the refusal to answer police questions to result in probable 
cause for an arrest). 
 55. Infra Part II.D.2. 
 56. See infra Part II.B (describing the personal information available to a police officer 
through the use of computer database technologies). 
 57. NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2003). 
 58. E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (Michie 
2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1) (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1902(a), 1321(6) 
(2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 856.021(2) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-36(b) (2004); 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402(1) (2003); LA. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215.1(A) (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 84.710(2) (West 2005); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401(2)(a) (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (2004); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 594:2, 644:6 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-3 (Michie 2003); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (McKinney 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2003); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 12-7-1 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1983 
(Supp. 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.24 (West 2004); see also Sam B. Warner, The 
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 344 (1942) (noting that some states model their 
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identify himself is a misdemeanor offense or a civil violation, while in 
others it is merely a factor police can consider in determining whether the 
suspect has violated loitering laws.59  In states without “stop and identify” 
statutes, a suspect may refuse to identify himself without penalty.60 
The Supreme Court’s prior case law regarding “stop and identify” 
statutes invalidated vague language that allowed police to request 
identification in general, but left the door open for a more specific 
articulation of the rule.61  Hiibel picks up where these cases left off.62 
B.   What’s in a Name? The Breadth of Computer Databases 
Before addressing the impact of Hiibel on Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, it is important to understand the potential array of 
                                                 
“stop and identify” statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act, an early English model code that 
permits an officer to stop a person reasonably suspected of a crime and demand his “name, 
address, business abroad and whither he is going”).  Other statutes are based on proposed 
text in the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 
Comment 4 (1980). 
 59. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (authorizing an officer who has stopped a 
suspect based on reasonable suspicion to arrest the suspect if he refuses to provide his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-213(a)(1) (stating 
that a person commits the offense of loitering if he lingers in a public place and refuses to 
provide his name or explain why he is there), and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (allowing an 
officer to detain and question a suspect who refuses to provide his name for up to two hours, 
but authorizing an arrest only if the officer determines that a crime has indeed been 
committed).  It is noteworthy that many of the state “stop and identify” statutes listed in note 
58 are unconstitutional under the Hiibel ruling because they allow police officers to demand 
more than a name.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103(1) (allowing police to obtain a 
suspect’s name and address, identification if available, and an explanation of his actions); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (requiring a suspect to give his name, address, business 
abroad and where he is going); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.50(1) (explaining that police 
can demand a suspect’s name, address and an explanation of his conduct). 
 60. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 117, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 
2456-57 (2004) (discussing the states’ various approaches to a suspect’s refusal to identify 
himself). 
 61. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (holding 
that a traditional vagrancy law was void for vagueness due to its broad scope and imprecise 
terms, which denied proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police officers to 
exercise unlimited discretion in enforcing the law); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) 
(ruling that the officers’ initial stop of the defendant was not based on specific, objective 
facts establishing reasonable suspicion sufficient to satisfy Terry); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 360 (1983) (finding California’s “stop and identify” statute void because it 
required a suspect to give “credible and reliable” identification).  The Court said this 
language provides no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, 
resulting in “virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.”  Id. 
(citing Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).  
However, the Court reserved comment on the constitutional validity of a “stop and identify” 
statute under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.  See Alan D. Hallock, Note, Stop-and-
Identify Statutes After Kolender v. Lawson:   Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
Issues, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1057, 1061-63 (1984) (evaluating the language in several state 
“stop and identify” statutes that failed to survive constitutional scrutiny). 
 62. See 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (summarizing the evolution of case law, from 
Terry to Hiibel, regarding police questioning during a Terry stop). 
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information that a name may reveal when placed in police hands.63  With 
the advent of computer database technology, compelled identification 
permits the government to engage in a far more extensive search of 
personal information than was contemplated in Terry.64 
1.   NCIC database 
The National Crime Information Center makes criminal history 
information widely available to police officers and law enforcement 
officials across the United States.65  State and local police access the FBI’s 
NCIC computer database millions of times each day in their normal police 
activities.66  According to the statute establishing and governing the NCIC 
database, there are several categories of information that police can enter 
and access via the database, including “identification, criminal 
identification, crime, and other records.”67  Significantly, a large portion of 
the FBI records on file is inaccurate or incomplete, and some records may 
not reflect the final outcome of a recently decided case.68  Nevertheless, 
courts historically have given substantial deference to information that 
police obtain through computer databases such as NCIC.69 
                                                 
 63. See id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cautioning that “[a] name 
can provide the key to a broad array of information about the person, particularly in the 
hands of a police officer with access to a range of law enforcement databases”). 
 64. See infra Part II.B (discussing various computer databases that state and local police 
can access, and the information that each provides with the input of a suspect’s name). 
 65. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER, 
at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/ncic.htm (last modified Apr. 8, 2003) (on file 
with the American University Law Review) [hereinafter NCIC WEB SITE] (setting forth the 
NCIC’s purpose, access and use constraints, sources of data, categories of individuals and 
records included, and safeguards); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PUB. 187670, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD 
INFORMATION:   A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001 UPDATE 30 (2001) [hereinafter BJS 
REPORT] (reporting that over fifty-nine million offenders were listed in the criminal history 
files of state central repositories since December 31, 1999), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/umchri01.pdf. 
 66. NCIC WEB SITE, supra note 65. 
 67. 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) (2004).  The personal identification information typically 
available through the NCIC includes an individual’s name, address, birth date, Social 
Security number, sex, race and physical characteristics.  BJS REPORT, supra note 65, at 28-
29. 
 68. See BJS REPORT, supra note 65, at 21 (warning that NCIC “name searches are not 
fully reliable and existing criminal record files may be inaccurate and incomplete, 
particularly with respect to case disposition information”).  In fact, the BJS REPORT finds 
that inadequacies in NCIC record accuracy and thoroughness comprise the “single most 
serious deficiency affecting” the NCIC system.  Id. at 38.  See also Brief of Amici Curiae 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal Scholars and Technical Experts at 
8, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (suggesting that based on the prevalence of 
inaccuracies in NCIC records, it is quite likely that misguided decisions will lead to 
unjustified arrests). 
 69. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1995) (upholding the use of evidence 
obtained from a false arrest record that was the product of a clerical error); United States v. 
Hines, 564 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 1977) (finding that reliance upon FBI’s NCIC database 
to supply probable cause for an arrest was acceptable).  The Court in Hines further noted 
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2.   Other databases—MDT and MATRIX 
In addition to the NCIC, there are several newer computer databases that 
offer police specialized information compiled from various sources.  A tool 
that many state and local police use is the Mobile Data Terminal (MDT), a 
portable computer that can access data from the Department of Motor 
Vehicles, the NCIC, and a state’s crime information center.70  The Multi-
State Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX) is a state-run 
system that links together information from public and private databases to 
give officers data from multiple sources via one efficient query.71  
Available documentation includes criminal history, driver’s license and 
vehicle information, jail records, digitized photographs, and financial 
data.72 
Although police use of computer databases to aid in their investigations 
is increasing, a discussion of this technology is notably absent from the 
Hiibel opinion.73  Instead, the Supreme Court makes a point of hinging its 
view that “stop and identify” statutes are constitutional on the fact that they 
only request a name, and do not seek broader forms of identification.74  The 
Court seems to ignore the reality that in the twenty-first century, a name is 
synonymous with such broader forms of identification due to the 
widespread use of computers to access information.75 
                                                 
that “[t]here are very few decisions where the reliability of NCIC reports has been 
challenged.”  Id. at 927. 
 70. See Darlene Cedres, Comment, Mobile Data Terminals and Random License Plate 
Checks:  The Need for Uniform Guidelines and a Reasonable Suspicion Requirement, 23 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 391, 397 (1997) (analyzing police use of Mobile Data 
Terminals to obtain a motorist’s personal information by conducting random computer 
searches of license plate numbers).  Cedres cautions that because the MDT technology is so 
new, there are no uniform guidelines governing law enforcement officials’ use of the 
devices, and as a result, citizens remain unprotected against arbitrary police use of such 
technology computers.  Id. 
 71. See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal 
Scholars and Technical Experts at 11-12, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (explaining 
that MATRIX is a direct response to the September 11 terrorist attacks and is already 
utilized by one thousand law enforcement agencies in Florida).  Funding for MATRIX 
comes in part from the Department of Justice.  The Department of Homeland Security has 
since offered an additional $8 million for the project.  Id. at 13.  Other states including 
Connecticut, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania are currently working to implement 
the program.  Id. at 14. 
 72. Id. at 12-13. 
 73. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2464  (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alluding 
to the information that a name can lead to with computer databases).  Interestingly, the 
majority opinion in Hiibel fails to mention the vast array of information law enforcement 
officials can obtain merely with the use of someone’s name.  Id. 
 74. See id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2457, 2459 (contending that an officer’s request for an 
individual’s name is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because merely asking for a 
name does not change the nature of the stop). 
 75. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1209 (Nev. 2002) 
(Agosti, J., dissenting) (noting that by upholding Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute, an 
officer can now “figuratively, reach in, grab the wallet and pull out the detainee’s 
identification”). 
STULIN OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:42:53 PM 
1462 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1449 
C.   The Facts of Hiibel 
The facts of Hiibel are quite basic for a case that has generated so much 
controversy.  Police in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon 
telephone call reporting an assault.76  In response, a sheriff went to the 
scene and found a man standing by a truck and a young woman sitting 
inside.77  The officer approached them and explained that he was 
investigating a report of a fight.78  He then asked the man if he had any 
identification on him, but the man refused to comply.79  The officer 
repeated this request eleven times, but the man continued to refuse, and the 
officer finally arrested him.80  This man, Larry Dudley Hiibel, was charged 
with violating Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute and sentenced to pay a 
fine of $250.81 
D.   Hiibel Redefines Terry 
The Hiibel decision redefines Terry even as it bases much of its analysis 
on the landmark 1968 case.  First, the Court’s validation of Nevada’s “stop 
and identify” statute deviates from long-standing precedent against 
compelled identification, and in effect allows an arrest based on less than 
probable cause.82  Second, it permits an investigative stop based on 
reasonable suspicion to go beyond the circumstances that justified it,  
contrary to a fundamental principle of Terry.83 
1. The court strays from long-standing precedent, creating a new 
authority for probable cause to arrest during a Terry stop 
The Court has repeatedly recognized an individual’s right not to respond 
to police questioning during an investigative Terry stop because such a stop 
is predicated only on reasonable suspicion and does not reach the level of 
probable cause necessary to make an arrest.84  In Hiibel, the majority 
                                                 
 76. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2454-55. The caller reported seeing a man 
assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road.  Id. 
 77. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2455.  The officer also observed skid marks in the gravel 
near the vehicle, which led him to believe the truck had come to a sudden stop, thereby 
heightening his suspicion.  Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  Compare id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2455 (failing to provide the complete 
conversation between the officer and Mr. Hiibel), with Dudley Hiibel’s Official Web Site 
[hereinafter Dudley Hiibel Web Site], at http://www.papersplease.org/hiibel/ 
facts.html (last updated July 9, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) 
(contending that Mr. Hiibel wanted to know what the officer was investigating before he 
provided his name, but that in response to this question, the officer merely answered “I’m 
investigating an investigation” and remained elusive). 
 80. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2455. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Infra Part II.D.1. 
 83. Infra Part II.D.2. 
 84. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (describing the “reasonable 
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dismisses this long-standing principle by concluding that the Court’s prior 
statements about compelled identification are not controlling.85  The Court 
also brushes aside the value of a name, deeming it an “insignificant” fact.86  
But Hiibel is as much about a suspect’s failure to give his name as it is 
about the value of the name itself.  By validating an officer’s authority to 
arrest a suspect for refusing to provide identification, the Court allows a 
suspect’s failure to give his name to morph a Terry stop into probable cause 
for an arrest.87 
A lengthy line of Fourth and Fifth Amendment case law, beginning with 
Terry, shows that individuals detained during a valid Terry stop do not 
have to respond to police interrogation, although officers can always 
attempt to solicit voluntary responses.88  Since Terry, the Court has both 
implicitly and explicitly reaffirmed this principle.  For example, in Adams 
v. Williams, the Court stated that it may be reasonable for an officer to 
attempt to determine a suspect’s identity during a Terry stop.89  At no point, 
however, did the Court say that an individual is required to respond.90  
Adams addressed the scope of an officer’s inquiry during a Terry stop; it 
did not address the obligation of the suspect to cooperate.91 
                                                 
suspicion” standard articulated in Terry and its purpose of allowing a brief, investigatory 
detention to confirm or dispel an officer’s suspicions and to protect his or her safety). 
 85. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-59 (addressing the defendant’s 
argument that precedent supports a suspect’s right to refuse to answer questions during a 
Terry stop, and thus precludes a finding in favor of compelled identification).  The majority 
brushes over some of its past statements that seem to speak against compelled identification 
and ultimately decides they are dicta, noting “[w]e do not read these statements as 
controlling.”  Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 86. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 87. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 9, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (contending that “the Fourth 
Amendment precludes the State from legislating a regime in which silence alone is 
sufficient to transform mere reasonable suspicion into the probable cause necessary to arrest 
an individual.”). 
 88. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice White’s 
concurrence in Terry, which clarifies the scope of police questioning during an investigative 
stop); infra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases that 
demonstrate a consistent position against compelled identification); see also Hiibel, 542 
U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (countering the majority’s argument 
that the Court’s prior statements about compelled identification are not controlling).  Justice 
Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, maintain “[t]his lengthy history—of 
concurring opinions, of references, and of clear explicit statements . . . while technically 
dicta, is the kind of strong dicta that the legal community typically takes as a statement of 
the law.”  Id.  They add that this law has remained unchanged for over twenty years, and 
there is no reason to erode it now.  Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2465-66. 
 89. See 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972) (upholding a Terry stop based on a tip from a 
known informant that the defendant had a handgun at his waist and was carrying narcotics).  
In Hiibel, the Court used this case to support its position that questions concerning a 
suspect’s identity are a routine part of many Terry stops, and serve an important government 
interest.  542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. 2458. 
 90. Adams, 407 U.S. at 146. 
 91. Id.  Moreover, in Adams the officer confirmed his suspicions without requesting the 
suspect’s identity and without any need for this information.  See id. at 148 (noting that once 
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In Kolender v. Lawson, Justice Brennan’s concurrence is particularly 
cautionary, although the Court in Hiibel does not acknowledge it.92  In 
describing a Terry stop, Justice Brennan reiterates the Court’s previous 
statements that such encounters must be brief, police can only conduct 
physical searches if necessary for their protection, and “most importantly, 
the suspect must be free to leave after a short time and to decline to answer 
the questions put to him.”93  He takes the warning one step further by 
noting that a “[f]ailure to observe these limitations converts a Terry 
encounter into the sort of detention that can be justified only by probable 
cause.”94  Under Justice Brennan’s analysis, “stop and identify” statutes by 
their very nature violate the limited scope of a Terry stop because they 
compel a response based on the threat of arrest and prosecution, for which 
probable cause is always required.95 
The Court’s articulations in Terry and Kolender come in the form of 
concurrences, but the Court has espoused the same principles in several 
majority opinions.96  In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court acknowledged that 
                                                 
the defendant rolled down the car window, the officer reached into the car and removed the 
handgun from his waist, where the informant had said it was located).  In this case, taking 
the time to request the suspect’s name might actually have hurt the officer, because the 
suspect could have used the gun during the interrogation.  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968) (creating the reasonable suspicion exception to the Fourth Amendment for this very 
reason—to protect officer safety—and thus limiting the scope of a Terry stop to achieve this 
purpose). 
 92. 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); see infra notes 93-95 and 
accompanying text (analyzing Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Kolender); Hiibel, 542 U.S. 
at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (discussing past cases that address police questioning during Terry 
stops, but choosing decisions that appear to support the majority’s position).  Conveniently, 
Kolender is not included in this discussion.  Kolender is, however, cited in Justice Breyer’s 
dissent as part of the lengthy history of Court opinions that took a consistent stand against 
compelled identification, id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 93. Kolender, 461 U.S. 352, 365 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Hallock, supra note 61, at 1070-71 (explaining that if police have the power to 
compel identification, a suspect may not be able to prevent invasion of his or her Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights).  For example, a person stopped and threatened with arrest 
under a state’s “stop and identify” statute might not know whether the officer has a 
justifiable reasonable suspicion for the stop in the first place.  Id.  Therefore, the suspect can 
either assert his Fourth Amendment rights and risk arrest, or permit a potentially arbitrary 
governmental invasion of privacy.  Id.  Mr. Hiibel alleges this is exactly what happened in 
his case.  Dudley Hiibel Web Site, supra note 79.  Mr. Hiibel claims that when the officer 
approached and requested identification, Mr. Hiibel asked what the officer was 
investigating.  Id.  The officer’s non-response was “I’m investigating an investigation.”  Id.  
Thus, with no information about why the officer had stopped him, Mr. Hiibel was faced 
with the choice of either giving his name, thereby risking further intrusion into his privacy, 
or being arrested.  Id.  He chose to remain silent because he believed he had a constitutional 
right to do so.  Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (acknowledging a suspect’s 
right to remain silent during a Terry stop); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984) 
(noting that a Terry detainee is not obliged to respond to police questioning); Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (stating that a suspect has a right not to respond to 
police interrogation absent probable cause). 
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during a Terry stop an officer may ask some questions to ascertain a 
suspect’s identity and to try to elicit information that will validate or dispel 
the officer’s suspicions.97  However, the Court explicitly stated that “the 
detainee is not obliged to respond.”98  Although the Hiibel decision 
declares this statement to be dicta and dismisses it,99 the context in which it 
was written is significant.  The Berkemer Court pointed out that Miranda 
warnings are not required when officers conduct a Terry stop precisely 
because, by its nature, such a stop is brief and should not result in 
incriminating statements.100  By implication, if a suspect is compelled to 
make statements during a Terry stop, then Miranda warnings would be 
necessary to protect the suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.101 
Although the Hiibel majority concluded that these statements were not 
controlling,102 the Court clearly recognized that by allowing police to 
compel identification during a Terry stop, it was departing from well-
established precedent.  During oral arguments, the justices grappled with 
this issue in their questions to the lawyer arguing on behalf of Nevada.103  
They queried:  “[I]f we have a repeated series of cases that say [a detainee 
is not obliged to respond to questions asked during a Terry stop], doesn’t 
there have to be a pretty good reason for departing from it?”104  In the end, 
the majority circumvented the issue by concluding that although the Fourth 
Amendment cannot require a suspect to answer police questions during a 
Terry stop, state law can.105  By so ruling, the Court reversed its position on 
a principle that has remained unchanged since 1968. 
                                                 
 97. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 117, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459 
(2004). 
 100. See 468 U.S. at 440 (noting that the relatively non-threatening nature of Terry stops, 
compared with other types of detentions, explains Miranda’s inapplicability to such 
investigative stops). 
 101. See Mark A. Godsey, When Terry Met Miranda:   Two Constitutional Doctrines 
Collide, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 733 (1994) (suggesting that Miranda warnings should be 
required during investigative stops due to the recent expansion of the Terry doctrine).  The 
article points out that Terry stops have become much more intrusive in recent years and 
often involve force that suggests a suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda.  Id. at 728.  
Thus, requiring Miranda warnings during Terry stops that become custodial in nature better 
protects civil liberties.  Id. at 737-41.  However, the article suggests that the Berkemer 
Court, by holding that Miranda warnings are not required during Terry stops, made clear 
that such stops should continue to be brief and non-intrusive.  Id. at 742-43. 
 102. 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 103. See Oral Argument Transcript at 36, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (noting 
that there are at least four prior cases suggesting police officers cannot require Terry 
suspects to identify themselves). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459 (acknowledging that while the Fourth 
Amendment itself cannot require a suspect to answer questions, precedent does not speak to 
whether state law can compel identification).  The Court balances the government interest in 
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Moreover, with this reversal, Justice Brennan’s warning comes to 
fruition.106  The Hiibel decision allows a suspect’s refusal to cooperate to 
transform a Terry stop, based solely on reasonable suspicion, into probable 
cause to arrest.107  Justice White, in his concurring opinion in Terry, clearly 
stated that a refusal to answer police questions “furnishes no basis for an 
arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued 
observation.”108  In Hiibel, the Court holds the exact opposite, concluding 
that a suspect’s refusal to provide identification furnishes a basis for arrest 
under a state “stop and identify” statute.109  Thus, with Hiibel, the Court has 
eroded Fourth Amendment protections by blurring the lines between 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause. 
2. Hiibel broadens the scope of a Terry stop beyond the 
circumstances which justified it 
Terry’s goal in carving out an exception to the probable cause 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment was to facilitate law enforcement 
officials’ investigation, detection, and prevention of crime.110  Thus, if an 
officer had specific facts to suggest a suspect may be engaged in criminal 
activity, the officer could conduct a brief stop to investigate.111  However, 
the Court specified that Terry stops should be limited in scope, and that 
officers who suspect criminal activity must investigate the situation in such 
a way as to confirm or dispel their suspicions as quickly as possible.112  The 
Court’s holding in Hiibel contradicts these fundamental principles. 
Importantly, the Court fails to explain how knowledge of a suspect’s 
name will facilitate officers’ investigation of a recent or imminent criminal 
act.  Rather, the majority lists several other government interests served by 
obtaining a suspect’s name during a Terry stop.113  For example, the Court 
                                                 
obtaining a suspect’s name against the activity’s intrusion on individual privacy.  See infra 
notes 123-125 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s balancing analysis, which 
finds that the government interest is sufficiently important that a state should be able to 
require a suspect to identify himself).  The Court qualified its decision as applying to 
statutes that compel disclosure of a name only, rather than those that allow a request for 
identification in general.  Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 106. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan’s 
concurrence in Kolender, which warns that absent probable cause, a suspect cannot be 
forced to answer questions). 
 107. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459. 
 108. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring). 
 109. 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2459-60. 
 110. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); see supra note 31 (discussing the need for 
quick action on the part of police officers as a justification for permitting Terry stops). 
 111. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-23; see supra note 33 and accompanying test (explaining that 
the police must have reasonable, articulable facts to support a Terry stop). 
 112. See supra note 33 (describing the stop and frisk as a limited search with the sole 
purpose of determining whether the suspect is armed). 
 113. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458. 
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argues that if officers know who they are dealing with, they can better 
assess the threat to their own safety.114  Without specifically saying so, the 
Court implies that officers should run an individual’s name through a 
computer database to determine whether the suspect has a past criminal 
record or an outstanding warrant.115 However, the majority does not 
provide any evidence to show that knowing a person’s identity or criminal 
record will better protect an officer from the potential for violence at that 
particular moment.116  The fundamental purpose of a Terry stop is to detect 
criminal activity that just took place or is about to take place, not to protect 
against a suspect’s tendency toward criminal activity based upon a prior 
record of criminal behavior.117  If an officer is taking the time to run a 
suspect’s name through a computer database, it is difficult to imagine that 
he fears for his or the public’s safety at that moment.118 
Moreover, Terry already addressed officer safety in this context by 
granting officers the right to conduct a frisk for weapons.119  The Court 
allowed a “carefully limited search” so that officers could discover 
weapons that might be used to assault them.120  The search was restricted 
precisely because of the significant intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights 
that it entailed.121  Hiibel, by justifying compelled identification in 
furtherance of officer safety, gives the police a chance to obtain a host of 
                                                 
 114. Id.  Other government interests the Court gives include clearing a suspect and 
allowing the police to look elsewhere, and assessing the possible danger to the victim.  Id. 
 115. See id. (stating that knowledge of a suspect’s identity might inform an officer that 
the suspect is wanted for another offense, or has a record of violence).  Although the Court 
does not explicitly say so, it is apparent that police officers cannot obtain this information 
without running the name through a computer database that provides information on the 
suspect’s criminal record.  See generally Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards:   
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697, 717 (2004) (noting that the only 
way to discover outstanding arrest warrants is to check the suspect’s identity against a 
database). 
 116. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (using the word “may” to describe 
what knowledge of a suspect’s identity might reveal, but not providing any specific 
examples in which knowledge of a suspect’s identity and criminal record has prevented 
violence against officers or members of the public). 
 117. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); see also Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of 
Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1209 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti, J., dissenting) (noting that a Terry search is 
purposefully limited to a pat-down for weapons because these are the instruments that lead 
to immediate violence; an officer could not investigate a soft object like a wallet).   The 
dissent warns that by allowing compelled identification, an officer “can now, figuratively, 
reach in, grab the wallet and pull out the detainee’s identification.”  Id. 
 118. See supra note 91 and accompanying text (noting that requesting identification from 
a suspect could put an officer in danger). 
 119. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31 (holding for the first time that officers can conduct a 
search of the outer clothing of suspects if they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
the individual may be armed and dangerous). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 26 (noting that a frisk is a “brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion 
upon the sanctity of the person”). 
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information that a frisk would not produce,122 and thus moves well beyond 
the limits set out in Terry. 
The Hiibel majority also fails to explain the relevance of Mr. Hiibel’s 
name to the circumstances that justified the initial Terry stop.123  In Hiibel, 
officers stopped the suspect based on a telephone call reporting an 
assault.124  Although the majority claims that knowing a name in this case 
would help officers assess the situation, they do not specify how a name or 
the information it might lead to would help dispel or confirm the officer’s 
suspicions that an assault occurred on that day, or that Mr. Hiibel was even 
involved.125  An officer’s duty in investigating the circumstances of the 
assault allegation in Hiibel would have been to question the woman in the 
truck to see if she was hurt, to question the man about the purported 
assault, and to question any witnesses to discover whether they saw an 
assault occur.126 
Furthermore, courts have reiterated the principle that any investigation 
conducted during a Terry stop must be specific to the circumstances which 
justified the initial stop.127  If a police officer uses the information obtained 
                                                 
 122. See supra Part II.B (detailing the type and amount of information that officers can 
obtain with a name through the use of computer databases). 
 123. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20 (establishing a two-fold inquiry for determining 
whether a search is reasonable:   (1) was the officer’s action “justified at its inception”; and 
(2) was it “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 
in the first place”).  While Terry’s progeny vacillated on the factors that go into the 
reasonable suspicion analysis, the Court has never strayed from the principle that the scope 
of a Terry stop must relate to the officer’s initial reason for stopping a suspect.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20); United 
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (finding a seizure cannot continue for an excessive 
period of time); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (holding that a seizure 
cannot resemble a traditional arrest).  The Hiibel Court even acknowledges the longevity of 
this principle, quoting it twice.  542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458-59.  The Court concludes, 
however, that the officer’s request for identification in Hiibel was reasonably related to the 
circumstances justifying the initial stop.  542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at  2460. 
 124. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2455. 
 125. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458; see, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 
59 P.3d 1201, 1208 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti, J., dissenting) (citing Carey v. Nev. Gaming 
Control Bd., 279 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2002), as an example of a name’s irrelevance to a Terry 
investigation).  In Carey, an officer suspected the defendant of cheating.  279 F.3d at 876.  
During the course of a Terry stop to investigate, the officer asked Carey for his 
identification, but he refused to provide it.  Id.  The officer then arrested Carey based on the 
same Nevada “stop and identify” statute at issue in Hiibel.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit held the 
statute violated the Fourth Amendment because the defendant’s interest in his personal 
security outweighed any possibility that identification would provide a link leading to arrest.  
Id. at 880.  This was particularly true because Carey’s name “was not relevant to 
determining whether Carey had cheated.”  Id.  In Hiibel, as in Carey, it is equally unclear 
how knowing the defendant’s name would have led the officer to either confirm or dispel 
his suspicions about whether an assault had occurred.  542 U.S. at ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2458. 
 126. See Dudley Hiibel Web Site, supra note 79 (stating that the officer never asked Mr. 
Hiibel’s daughter any questions or even looked at her until she was forced out of the car, 
thrown to the ground face-first, and handcuffed).  Officers charged Mimi Hiibel with 
resisting arrest, although the charges were later dropped.  Id. 
 127. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; see, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) 
STULIN OFFTOPRINTER 2/24/2006  2:42:53 PM 
2005] DOES HIIBEL REDEFINE TERRY? 1469 
from a computer search of a suspect’s name—such as an outstanding 
warrant—to conduct further investigations unrelated to the initial stop, then 
the officer has moved beyond what is allowed under Terry and must have 
probable cause.128 
Finally, Terry stipulated that the duration of an investigative stop must 
be brief.129  Although the Court has repeatedly declined to establish a bright 
line rule declaring how long Terry stops can last, it generally considers 
“whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.”130  Conducting a 
computer search to ascertain a suspect’s past criminal record is not a means 
of investigation likely to confirm or dispel officers’ suspicions about an 
immediate situation.131  Instead, it is a means of finding additional 
information about a suspect that may lead officers to an arrest when they 
would not otherwise have probable cause.132  Such a practice therefore 
deviates from the limits on investigative stops established in Terry and adds 
to Hiibel’s erosion of the Terry doctrine and the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                 
(applying the Terry two-part analysis and finding that the thirty to forty minute detention did 
not meet Terry’s brevity requirement). 
 128. Compare Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2458 (suggesting that obtaining a 
suspect’s name to determine his past criminal record and using this information to arrest him 
is valid under Terry), with Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1987) (observing that 
the plain view exception to the Fourth Amendment does not permit an officer to move the 
item into plain view, even slightly, because doing so constitutes an unauthorized invasion of 
privacy that is not related to the interest that justified the initial intrusion).  The Hicks Court 
noted that “taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion . . . 
produce[s] a new invasion of respondent’s privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstances 
that validated” the initial search.  480 U.S. at 325.  See also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 
U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (holding that a search violated the Fourth Amendment where the 
officer could not immediately ascertain the nature of an object found during a Terry frisk, 
and only upon a further search did he realize it was contraband).  See generally Brief for the 
American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, Hiibel, 542 
U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (maintaining that compelling a suspect to identify himself in most 
cases will not be reasonably justified by the interests that supported the initial intrusion). 
 129. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (interpreting Terry to mean that an 
“investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop.”). 
 130. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 676 (1985); see also id. at 691 (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (noting that regardless of how efficient it is for law enforcement officials to 
prolong questioning to investigate a crime, “a seizure that in duration, scope, or means goes 
beyond the bounds of Terry cannot be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment in the 
absence of probable cause”). 
 131. See Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 18, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554) (concluding that the requirement that 
an individual identify himself during an investigative stop goes beyond the limited intrusion 
allowed in Terry and its progeny). 
 132. See Martinelli v. City of Beaumont, 820 F.2d 1491, 1494 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1366-67, to show that Nevada’s “stop and identify” 
statute in effect allows officers to “bootstrap the authority to arrest on less than probable 
cause”). 
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III. THE SILENT IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISION TO COMPEL IDENTIFICATION:  
 A COMPARISON TO THE DRUG WAR 
The question remains as to why the Court would overturn years of 
precedent rejecting compelled identification, and in effect redefine long-
standing Terry principles,133 merely to make a suspect identify himself on 
the rare chance that it might lead to an arrest.  The Court purportedly based 
its decision on the balancing analysis typically applied in criminal 
procedure cases, ultimately finding that the government interest in 
preventing crime is more important than privacy interests in a name.134  
However, the Court had the opportunity to apply this reasoning to past 
cases involving “stop and identify” statutes and refused to do so.135  The 
reason for the Court’s controversial decision in Hiibel is more likely rooted 
in what it did not say. 
A.   A Brief History:  The War on Drugs 
Although the judicial branch of government generally serves as a check 
on the executive branch, courts often make decisions with current events in 
mind.136  The most significant example of politics influencing the Court’s 
decisions occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, when drug trafficking 
flourished and the use and abuse of illegal narcotics became one of 
America’s gravest problems.137  Many of the defendants facing drug 
                                                 
 133. See supra Part II (delineating Hiibel’s inconsistency with Supreme Court 
precedent). 
 134. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2459.  The Court makes the outcome of the 
balancing test in this case appear obvious:   it reasons that a name serves important 
government interests, and further that a name is so “insignificant” as to rarely be 
incriminating.  Id. at 2461. 
 135. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing several cases in which the 
Court invalidated state “stop and identify” statutes because they were too vague). 
 136. See generally Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2138 (arguing that Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights have varied with crime rates before, and they are likely to do so in the 
future).  The essay points out that Terry itself arose from the higher crime rates in the 1960s, 
and the expansion of the “reasonable suspicion” standard evolved with the war on drugs of 
the 1980s.  Id. at 2152, 2140.  The essay further suggests that September 11, although it 
happened all on one day, represents an increased crime wave because of the sheer number of 
people who died.  Id. at 2138.  Thus, courts likely will respond by giving police increased 
power.  Id.  See also Barbara Babcock, Hiibel Revisited:   Apocalyptic Constitutional 
Moment Ahead, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2004), at http://slate.msn.com/id/2096927/ (last visited 
June 28, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (pointing out that the 
Terry decision came down the year that Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. were 
assassinated and Richard Nixon was elected president on a law and order platform). 
 137. See Thirty Years of America’s Drug War:  A Chronology, at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited July 16, 2005) 
(detailing the government’s efforts to combat the nation’s drug problem); see also Steven 
Belenko, The Challenges of Integrating Drug Treatment Into the Criminal Justice Process, 
63 ALB. L. REV. 833, 834 (2000) (collecting data showing that between 1980 and 1998, the 
number of arrests nationwide increased forty percent, with arrests for drug possession, 
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charges were repeat offenders, and the courtrooms began to overflow with 
cases stemming from the drug trade.138 
Aware of the increasing threat to the nation, the Nixon administration 
coined the term “war on drugs” in describing their domestic policies on 
drugs and drug use.139  President Ronald Reagan formally initiated the 
metaphoric war during a radio address in 1982, in which he commented:  
“[w]e’re making no excuses for drugs—hard, soft, or otherwise.  Drugs are 
bad, and we’re going after them.”140  President George H. W. Bush also 
made the war on drugs a focal point of his presidency by urging a policy of 
“zero tolerance.”141  As such, he signed into law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988, which created the Office of National Drug Control Policy and 
provided for harsher criminal justice policies and workplace drug testing.142 
In general, state and federal law enforcement offices received massive 
budget hikes during the 1980s and formed a slew of special drug units that 
increased the number of drug-related arrests.143  However, local law 
                                                 
possession for sale of controlled substances, and sales of drugs increasing 168% during this 
time).  
 138. See Anthony C. Thompson, Courting Disorder:   Some Thoughts on Community 
Courts, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 68 (2002) (discussing the history and rationale for 
drug courts, which emerged as the judicial system’s answer to its inability to handle all the 
drug cases flooding the country’s courtrooms). 
 139. See David Holmstrom, War on Drugs, Two Decades Later:   Critics Say It’s Failed, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 27, 1992, at 1 (noting that President Nixon was the first U.S. 
President to declare a “war on drugs”); see also Thirty Years of America’s Drug War:   A 
Chronology, supra note 137 (noting that in 1971, when Nixon coined the term “war on 
drugs,” Congress also passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 
which consolidated previous anti-drug laws, provided federal funding for drug-abuse 
prevention and treatment efforts, and established tough penalties for drug trafficking). 
 140. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation (Oct. 2, 1982), in 18 WKLY. 
COMP. PRES. DOC., Oct. 11, 1982, at 1250. 
 141. See Excerpts from News Session by Bush, Watkins and Bennett, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 1989, at D16 (quoting Bush’s announcement of a national strategy to target drug 
trafficking and drug abuse); see also Roseanne Scotti, Comment, The “Almost 
Overwhelming Temptation”:   The Hegemony of Drug War Discourse in Recent Federal 
Court Decisions Involving Fourth Amendment Rights, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
139, 142-43 (2000) (summarizing America’s drug policy over the past two decades). 
 142. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988); see also 
OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, at 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/about/index.html (last updated Apr. 11, 2003) (on 
file with the American University Law Review) (characterizing the office’s mission as one 
of establishing policies, priorities, and objectives for the United States’ drug control 
program). 
 143. Thompson, supra note 138, at 68; see also Sandra Guerra Thompson, Did the War 
on Drugs Die with the Birth of the War on Terrorism? A Closer Look at Civil Forfeiture and 
Racial Profiling After 9/11, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 147, 148 (2002) (compiling data 
suggesting that since 1988, the total funds received by state and local law enforcement for 
targeting drugs is at least $3 billion, and probably even several billion dollars higher).  The 
article suggests that a new federal distribution system enacted in 1988—asset forfeiture—
gave state and local governments profit incentives to assist federal agents in conducting 
drug interdiction activities.  Id. at 147.  Thus, federally-funded local drug task forces 
became prevalent.  Id.  Also, federal funds supported the activities of local police in “High 
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas,” and the federal government sponsored “Weed and Seed” 
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enforcement needed more authority to use these resources effectively.144  
As a result, in a series of cases spanning the last two decades, the Supreme 
Court consistently loosened Fourth Amendment protections in the name of 
the war on drugs.145 
B.   The Court’s Use of Drug War Discourse 
In the initial drug war cases, the Court rooted its decisions in criminal 
procedure, analyzing holdings from past cases and applying established 
principles to the facts at hand.146  The Court evolved its analysis in later 
decisions, however, to employ strong drug war rhetoric, in turn failing to 
apply an objective balancing analysis and instead deferring to government 
needs. 
An examination of some Supreme Court decisions from the 1980s and 
1990s demonstrates this theory.  In one line of cases, the Court gradually 
allowed law enforcement officials to use a “drug courier profile” to satisfy 
the “reasonable suspicion” standard necessary to make a Terry stop.147  In 
United States v. Mendenhall, the Court embarked on this expansion of the 
“reasonable suspicion” standard without the use of drug war rhetoric.148 
                                                 
programs to eradicate drug crime in local neighborhoods and revitalize them.  Id. at 148. 
 144. See generally Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2144 (suggesting that when the crime rate 
rises, police seek a judicial loosening of the rules that restrict them, and thus Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment protections fluctuate with the incidence of crime). 
 145. See Staci O. Schorgl, Note, Sacrificing the Fourth Amendment in the Name of 
Drugs:   State v. Damask, 66 UMKC L. REV. 707, 708 (1998) (noting that courts have 
repeatedly sacrificed Fourth Amendment principles in exchange for ending the drug war 
through decisions that endorse random drug testing of student athletes, searches of curbside 
trash, and searches of passengers on interstate buses, even when there is no suspicion of 
drug activity). 
 146. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552-55 (1980) (rooting its 
decision on Fourth Amendment seizure law); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441-42 (1980) 
(basing its decision on the principles articulated in Terry). 
 147. Compare Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 550, 554-56 (upholding a Terry stop in which 
drug enforcement administration officials approached a woman at an airport because she fit 
the profile of a drug courier), with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1968) (specifying that 
the purpose of a Terry stop is limited to ascertaining whether a suspect is armed and 
dangerous).  See also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (stating that just 
because an officer’s articulation of reasonable suspicion relies on a profile, it does not 
detract from the evidentiary significance of the suspicion).  Sokolow is significant because it 
expanded the “reasonable suspicion” standard to include a totality of the circumstances 
approach.  490 U.S. at 7-8.  Accordingly, individual actions such as those comprising a 
profile may be innocent, but when taken together they can create a valid reasonable 
suspicion to justify a Terry stop, regardless of whether they suggest that an individual may 
be armed.  Id. at 10.  See generally Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 494 (1983) (describing 
the drug courier profile as a set of characteristics found to be typical of people carrying 
illegal drugs).  Among the relevant characteristics are youth, appearing pale and nervous 
and looking around at other people, paying for a plane ticket in cash with a large number of 
bills, and writing only a name and destination on the luggage identification card.  Id. 
 148. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558 (determining that the suspect, who was 
approached at the airport because she fit the profile of a drug courier, consented to the 
search).  By finding consent, the Court was able to uphold the search without performing the 
requisite balancing analysis and without using the war on drugs as a basis for its reasoning.  
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However, the tide turned in United States v. Sokolow, in which the 
Supreme Court openly cited the drug war as its reason for granting 
certiorari and ultimately decided to uphold officers’ use of a drug courier 
profile in making Terry stops.149  In Sokolow, the careful balancing analysis 
of earlier Fourth Amendment cases was subsumed by the majority’s 
concern that a failure to uphold the stop in this case would have “serious 
implications for the enforcement of the federal narcotics laws.”150  
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the need to balance competing 
public and private interests must give way when the police need to make 
quick on-the-spot stops.151 
Sokolow avoided substantive discussion of the balancing factors over 
which the Court agonized in the Terry decision.152  Additionally, it showed 
a marked change in direction by the Supreme Court, almost turning the 
Terry analysis into the application of a bright line rule.153  In lieu of 
weighing and balancing competing factors, the Court indicated that because 
of the war on drugs, if an individual’s behavior is suggestive of criminal 
activity, then courts likely will uphold police action to stop and 
investigate.154 
In a second line of prominent decisions, the Court openly justified 
workplace and school drug testing using drug war language.  In National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court, adopting the Drug 
Screening Task Force’s argument, reasoned that “no segment of society is 
immune from the threat of illegal drug use,” and that there was “no room in 
the Customs Service for those who [broke] the laws prohibiting the 
                                                 
Id.  As a result, Mendenhall indicates the Court’s early willingness to defer to law 
enforcement needs in fighting the drug war, although it was not ready to justify its decisions 
with specific drug war language at that time.  446 U.S. at 558. 
 149. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (stating that the reason the Court granted certiorari was 
because of the case’s “serious implications” for the enforcement of recently-enacted drug 
laws); see also supra notes 138-142 and accompanying text (providing a summary of the 
drug policies enacted in the late 1980s).  In 1988, immediately before Sokolow was decided, 
President George H. W. Bush signed into law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. 
 150. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (adopting a “totality of the circumstances” test to 
determine whether a drug courier profile satisfies the Terry “reasonable suspicion” 
standard—and determining that it does—rather than engaging in the balancing analysis that 
the Terry Court used and recommended be applied on a case-by-case basis). 
 151. Id. at 11; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (1968) (acknowledging that the need for 
immediate police action was an important factor, but taking the time to balance this need 
against the privacy rights that were being curtailed). 
 152. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s deference 
to anti-drug laws in the 1980s). 
 153. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9.  By implicitly declaring that the use of a drug courier 
profile was sufficient to satisfy the “reasonable suspicion” standard, the Court in effect 
departed from Terry and set out a rule.  See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (asserting that each 
subsequent case should be decided on its own facts). 
 154. See supra notes 148-152 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s application 
of the drug courier profile). 
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possession and use of illegal drugs.”155  In Vernonia School District v. 
Acton, the Court substituted drug war rhetoric for facts and evidence of 
drug use among students.156  It described drug use as an “evil” affecting not 
only the general public, but also reaching children, for whom the 
government has a special interest in protecting.157  The Court, in justifying 
school drug testing, described the disciplinary problems allegedly caused 
by drug use as having reached epidemic proportions. However, it dismissed 
the importance of the rights being curtailed.158 
Perhaps the Court’s strongest admission of its intention to help fight the 
war on drugs came in California v. Acevedo.159  The dissent in Acevedo 
wryly observed that “[n]o impartial observer could criticize this Court for 
hindering the progress of the war on drugs.”160  The dissent went on to call 
the majority “loyal foot soldier[s] in the Executive’s fight against crime.”161  
Such language, from within the Court itself, was a powerful indicator of the 
Court’s apparent deference to law enforcement officials, and its 
abandonment of the objective balancing analysis. 
C.   A Brief History:  The War on Terrorism 
The modern war on terrorism has replaced the war on drugs as the most 
salient issue facing the nation.162  Terrorism presents a much more 
immediate and dangerous threat to the country than did drug trafficking, 
but it also has proven to be a graver threat to Americans’ fundamental civil 
liberties due to the nature of the government’s response.163  For example, 
President George W. Bush’s declaration of a national emergency after the 
September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon allowed 
the government to detain over 1,000 people, most of them Muslim, in its 
                                                 
 155. 489 U.S. 656, 660 (1989) (holding that requiring U.S. Customs Service employees 
to undergo urinalysis to screen for drugs did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even 
though there was no evidence of drug abuse among the employees). 
 156. 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (finding that an Oregon school district’s policy of 
testing student athletes for drugs did not violate the students’ Fourth Amendment rights). 
 157. Id. at 662. 
 158. Id. at 663. 
 159. See 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991) (asserting that police can search a container in an 
automobile without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that it may contain 
drugs). 
 160. Id. at 601 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Cf. Sandra Guerra Thompson, supra note 143, at 147-48 (discussing the effects of 
terrorism on the war on drugs, and noting that with money diverted to fighting terrorism, 
there will be a decline in the resources devoted specifically to eradicating drug trafficking). 
 163. See generally War on Terrorism, Immigration Enforcement Since September 11, 
2001:   Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of 
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 28-36 (2003) (statement of Laura 
Murphy, Director, ACLU) (highlighting the constitutional violations of the government’s 
detention policies following September 11, and suggesting a better approach to immigration 
enforcement that respects civil liberties and fundamental values). 
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investigation of the hijackings.164  Most of the detainees were held for 
several months in jail, often in solitary confinement.165  The government 
refused to release the names of those detained, saying it was valuable 
intelligence that the government would not share with enemies in times of 
war.166  In the end, the media revealed that many detainees were held on the 
flimsiest of evidence, and only one was charged with any offense related to 
the September 11 attacks.167 
Congress also moved quickly to grant law enforcement agencies 
sweeping new powers to combat terrorism.  The controversial USA Patriot 
Act allows the FBI to conduct, among other things, secret searches and 
surveillance of phone and Internet activity.168  Many have argued that such 
extreme measures are inadequate to ferret out terrorists and instead present 
a more serious threat to our constitutional rights.169 
                                                 
 164. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS 
REGARDING POST SEPTEMBER 11 DETENTIONS IN THE USA, at http://www.amnestyusa. 
org/countries/usa/document.do?id=E7EA69A4BB5FA3B980256B7B006439B7 (last visited 
May 24, 2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (evaluating the many 
detentions that occurred after September 11 and concluding that the government deprived 
many detainees of certain basic rights guaranteed under international law). 
 165. See Jules Lobel, Symposium Article, Preventive Detention:   Prisoners, Suspected 
Terrorists and Permanent Emergency, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 392-95 (2003) 
(examining the preventive detention mechanisms utilized by the Bush Administration in its 
response to the terrorist threat). 
 166. See Hanna Rosin, Groups Find Way to Get Names of INS Detainees; Presentations 
on Rights Planned in NJ Facilities, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at A16 (explaining that even 
though the government refused to release information on the detainees, some civil rights 
groups took advantage of an existing INS policy that allows them to hold legal presentations 
in INS facilities, which in turn allows them to compile a list of detainees’ names for public 
dissemination). 
 167. See Laura Parker et al., Secure Often Means Secret, USA TODAY, May 16, 2002, at 
A1 (reporting that only one detainee, Zaccarias Moussaoui, who had been detained prior to 
September 11, 2001, has been charged with an offense related to the September 11 attacks). 
 168. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272, 345 (2004) (giving the government greater power to track and intercept 
communications, both for law enforcement and foreign intelligence gathering purposes).  
The law also provides more authority for the government to reduce foreign money 
laundering, halt illegal immigration, and detain and remove foreign terrorists from 
American soil.  See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE 
USA PATRIOT ACT:   A SKETCH passim (2002) (providing a summary of the Patriot Act and 
its legislative history), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21203.pdf.  But see Dan 
Eggen, Key Part of Patriot Act Ruled Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A16 
(reporting that a New York federal judge found a key part of the Patriot Act unconstitutional 
because it allows the FBI to obtain information from Internet providers without judicial 
oversight or public review).  Judge Victor Marrero found that the provision violates free 
speech rights by imposing permanent secrecy on the targeted companies.  Id.  According to 
the news article, the government is reviewing its options but likely will appeal the decision.  
Id. 
 169. See generally AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND 
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS THAT THREATEN OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES, at 
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=11813&c=207 (last visited Oct. 10, 
2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) (alleging that the Patriot Act 
threatens Americans’ First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
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Unlike the war on drugs before it, fighting the war on terrorism is 
primarily the responsibility of the federal government.170  To some, this 
might suggest that Supreme Court decisions will not produce significant 
legal change as they did in the 1980s, when local police departments played 
a significant role in fighting the war on drugs.171  However, even though 
the FBI is primarily responsible for pursuing specific allegations against 
potential terrorists, it lacks the manpower to conduct investigations on a 
local level.172  In turn, that manpower likely will come from street 
policing.173  The Department of Justice has already decided to enlist the 
help of state and local police in its enforcement of federal immigration 
laws.174  Accordingly, Supreme Court decisions affecting ordinary policing 
can still play an important role in the war on terrorism.175  Hiibel is one of 
the first cases to reflect this idea.176 
D.   The Lack of Terrorism War Discourse in Hiibel 
Although rhetoric about the war is notably absent from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Hiibel, the terrorism threat against America likely 
played a key role in the Court’s decision.177  Terrorism was certainly a 
theme of the 2004 summer session; the Court ruled on three enemy 
                                                 
 170. See Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2159 (explaining that the allocation of authority to the 
federal government, through laws such as the USA Patriot Act, distinguishes the September 
11 attacks from more ordinary crime waves in which local police bear the brunt of the 
responsibility).  But see April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? 
State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 
1149, 1151 (2004) (pointing out that although the power to regulate immigration generally 
falls under the purview of the federal government, the government typically will not 
preempt state and local enforcement activity in this area as long as federal interests are not 
harmed). 
 171. See Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2159 (noting that if federal agents are primarily 
responsible for dealing with terrorism, courts may not feel pressure to defer to the authority 
of local police departments). 
 172. Id. at 2160. 
 173. Id.; see also McKenzie, supra note 170, at 1155 (noting that as security concerns 
continue to rise, the federal government will turn increasingly to the states for help). 
 174. See McKenzie, supra note 170, at 1155-56 (stressing that Attorney General John 
Ashcroft has asked that local police voluntarily take part in the enforcement of federal 
immigrations laws, and in particular, that states begin arresting people for violations of 
criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act); see also Michael J. 
Wishnie, Terrorism and the Constitution, Civil Liberties in a New America:   State and 
Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1085-87 (2004) 
(arguing that the Department of Justice’s determination that state and local police should 
help enforce immigration laws is “among the most dangerous” initiatives to result from the 
September 11 attacks). 
 175. See Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 133 (suggesting that the judiciary may be called 
upon many times during the war on terrorism to address how far the government may go in 
fighting the war before it infringes upon constitutionally protected privacy rights). 
 176. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 117, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004). 
 177. See infra Part III.D (examining the litigation leading up to the Hiibel decision, 
which highlighted the need for police to obtain identification from suspected terrorists as a 
key reason to uphold Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute). 
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combatant cases just seven days after it decided Hiibel.178  However, while 
the Court in these cases openly discussed current events and maintained 
that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President,”179 the Hiibel 
decision was completely silent on the war, despite the parties addressing it 
in their various briefs180 and the lower courts responding in their 
opinions.181 
Although it is not the first Terry case to be decided since September 11, 
Hiibel is the first to represent a change in the Court’s interpretation of the 
law.182  The first case since September 11 to invoke the Terry doctrine, 
United States v. Arvizu,183 did not spark any new legal developments,184 but 
nonetheless has led many commentators to criticize the Court for eroding 
the “reasonable suspicion” standard beyond recognition.185  In Arvizu, a 
unanimous Court upheld a Terry stop based on a series of factors that, 
although separately were susceptible to innocent explanation, in 
combination were sufficient to justify the officer’s reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.186 
Although terrorism is not mentioned anywhere in the Arvizu opinion, the 
connection is evidenced by some of the justices’ statements during oral 
arguments.  Justice O’Connor noted “[w]e live in a perhaps more 
dangerous age today than we did when this event took place.”187  She 
                                                 
 178. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (holding that 
in seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant, Mr. Hamdi should not be 
deprived of his constitutional right to due process, which includes receiving notice of the 
basis for his classification and a having a fair chance to deny the government’s assertions 
before a neutral decision-maker); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, __, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 
2722-25 (2004) (evading the question of whether the President can detain Mr. Padilla 
militarily by holding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over his habeas petition); Rasul 
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, __, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004) (ruling that the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees have access to U.S. courts to challenge their detentions). 
 179. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2650. 
 180. Brief for the Petitioner at 9, 42, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (03-5554). 
 181. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002). 
 182. Supra text accompanying notes 129-132, 176. 
 183. 534 U.S. 266 (2002). 
 184. See Michael R. Stahlman, Article, New Developments in Search and Seizure:   
More than Just a Matter of Semantics, 2002 ARMY LAW. 31, 40 (2002) (noting that the 
significance of Arvizu lies in its facts, because although the case did not change the law, it 
nonetheless provided officers with a representative fact pattern and the Court’s analysis of 
why those particular facts were sufficient to justify a valid reasonable suspicion). 
 185. See Wells, supra note 20, at 913 (cautioning that if a police officer can take a 
“wholly innocent” factor and turn it into reasonable suspicion, then the reasonable suspicion 
test does not work to uphold Fourth Amendment guarantees). 
 186. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. 
 187. Oral Argument Transcript at 32, Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (No. 00-1519).  The stop at 
issue in Arvizu took place in 1998, before the September 11 attacks.  534 U.S. at 268.  
During oral arguments, Justice O’Connor highlighted the importance of having a loose 
“reasonable suspicion” standard to fight the war on terrorism through her query:  “[A]re we 
going to back off from totality of the circumstances in an era when it may become very 
important to us to have that as the overall test?”  Oral Argument Transcript at 32, Arvizu, 
534 U.S. 266 (No. 00-1519). 
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expressed concern that the Ninth Circuit, in ruling against the government, 
was applying an excessively rigid form of the “totality of the 
circumstances” test, and that this rigidity was more than “common sense 
would dictate today.”188 
The language of the opinion is also noteworthy, primarily because it 
emphasizes the Court’s deference to police judgment.189  The opinion 
points out that the totality of the circumstances test allows officers to draw 
from their own experiences and training to “make inferences from and 
deductions about the cumulative information available to them.”190  Instead 
of objectively balancing the interests of the government against individual 
liberties, as put forth in Terry, the Court in Arvizu appears to be bowing to 
the expertise of the police.191 
Arvizu was a unanimous decision that did not signify a change in the 
law. In contrast, Hiibel, the next Terry case to reach the Court, was a 
splintered 5-4 decision that signaled not only a departure from precedent, 
but also a repudiation of some of the fundamental principles articulated in 
Terry.192  While the subject of terrorism was notably absent from the Hiibel 
decision, it pervaded many of the legal documents filed throughout the 
litigation.  For example, terrorism was one of the key bases Nevada relied 
upon in defending its “stop and identify” statute, and terrorism played a 
significant role in the Supreme Court of Nevada’s decision to uphold the 
statute as constitutional.193  In arguments before the Nevada Supreme 
Court, the State maintained that its interest in finding wanted felons and 
terrorists justified the demand for compelled identification.194  The majority 
agreed, writing: 
[W]e are at war against enemies who operate with concealed identities 
and the dangers we face as a nation are unparalleled . . . To deny officers 
the ability to request identification from suspicious persons creates a 
                                                 
 188. Oral Argument Transcript at 32, Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (No. 00-1519). 
 189. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277. 
 190. Id. at 273. 
 191. See Wells, supra note 20, at 911-13 (arguing that with Arvizu, the Court is 
advocating a deference to police officers in three specific areas:  (1) the Court is moving 
toward a test in which the police officer is viewed as an expert; (2) the Court is allowing 
“wholly innocent factors” to form part of the “totality of the circumstances” test; and (3) 
with innocent factors able to satisfy the “reasonable suspicion” standard, officers can stop 
suspects on little more than a hunch); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Police Investigatory 
Stops, 227 N.Y.L.J. 32 (Feb. 19, 2002) (maintaining that Arvizu sends a message to the 
lower courts “that they should not lightly second guess the evaluation by an experienced law 
officer”). 
 192. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 117, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2461 
(2004); see supra Parts II.C-D (analyzing the Hiibel decision and finding that it ignores a 
lengthy history of case law taking a position against compelled identification, and for the 
first time redefines the scope of a Terry stop). 
 193. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002). 
 194. Brief in Opposition to Cert. Petition at 9, Hiibel, 542 U.S. 117 (No. 03-5554). 
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situation where an officer could approach a wanted terrorist or sniper but 
be unable to identify him or her if the person’s behavior does not rise to 
the level of probable cause necessary for an arrest.195 
The state opinion quoted a recent interview in which Senator Tom 
Daschle admitted that terrorism is “changing the way we live and the way 
we act and the way we think.”196  It quoted President George W. Bush’s 
statement that terrorism has created “a different kind of war that requires a 
different type of approach and a different type of mentality.”197  The 
opinion also discussed the deaths resulting from the September 11 attacks 
and the sniper attacks in Washington, D.C., as well as the deaths suffered 
from exposure to mail contaminated with Anthrax.198  Through its inclusion 
of these statements and images, it is clear that the Nevada Supreme Court 
based its decision to uphold the state’s “stop and identify” statute squarely 
on the government’s interest in fighting terrorism.199  Therefore, it is 
significant that the Supreme Court was aware of this language while 
deciding Hiibel, but consciously chose to leave the terrorism rhetoric out of 
its opinion and create its own rationale for the decision.200  The purposeful 
omission suggests that, although the Court agreed with the notion that 
police should have the authority to ask for identification, it did not want to 
base this authority on the war on terrorism, as did the Nevada Supreme 
Court.201 
                                                 
 195. Hiibel, 59 P.3d at 1206. 
 196. Id. (quoting Interview with Senator Tom Daschle (Oct. 21, 2002), at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,66236,00.html) (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 197. Id. (quoting President George W. Bush, Speech Before the Media (Oct. 11, 2001), 
at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/10/11/gen.bush.transcript/index.html (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 198. Id. (citing the tragic deaths of over “3,000 unsuspecting men, women and children 
at the hands of terrorists,” as well as the deaths of 17 sniper victims—which spanned six 
states—in support of the court’s position that fighting terrorism is an important government 
interest). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 133 (suggesting that the Court often 
defers to the perceived needs of law enforcement).  The lecture asserts that the Court has a 
tendency “to pretend that the world we all know is not the world in which law enforcement 
operates.”  Id.  The lecture suggests that by creating this false dichotomy, the Court can 
subtly defer to law enforcement needs.  Id. at 134. 
 201. Id.  Analogizing supra note 198 to Hiibel, it appears that the Court has chosen to 
delude itself into thinking that the war on terrorism plays no role in police activities.  
Instead, the Court focuses on the insignificance of a name to the majority of people, thus 
enabling it to defer to police needs without discussing its underlying motivations.  Hiibel v. 
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 117, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 2460-61 (2004).  See 
Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout:   Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. 
CT. REV. 153, 206-08 (2002) (contending that the majority in United States v. Drayton, 536 
U.S. 194 (2002), mistakenly tried to argue that bus passengers actually welcome police 
requests to search their belongings and their persons because its purpose is to enhance their 
security).  In reality, by basing much of the Drayton analysis on its perception of public 
opinion, the Court succeeded in avoiding a rule that would restrict the ability of police 
officers to investigate terrorism.  Id. at 221.  In the same way, Hiibel bases much of its 
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Perhaps it is too early in the fight against terrorism for the Court to bring 
in such rhetoric.202  In Mendenhall, the Court began its unraveling of the 
Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard by grounding its decision in Fourth 
Amendment seizure law, rather than on the drug war, even though the 
underlying purpose was evident.203  The Court waited until the drug war 
became more pervasive and gained popular support before it became a 
“loyal foot soldier” in that war.204 
Similarly, the Hiibel Court grounds its analysis in Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment case law, rather than on the war on terrorism.205  The Court 
claims to engage in the requisite objective balancing analysis by noting that 
obtaining a suspect’s identity during the course of a Terry stop serves 
important government interests of officer and public safety.206  
Furthermore, addressing the intrusion on individual liberties, the Court 
determines that “[a]nswering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so 
insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual 
circumstances.”207 
However, this analysis leaves several questions unanswered.  The Court 
emphasizes the government interest in obtaining a suspect’s name, but it 
fails to explain why this interest is compelling.208  Furthermore, the Court 
glazes over the decision’s impact on privacy rights.209  In the Vernonia 
                                                 
analysis on the insignificance of a name, and thus succeeds in giving police more powers to 
use in the fight against terrorism.  542 U.S. at  __, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61. 
 202. See Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2160 (suggesting that in post-September 11 America, 
the Court likely will defer to law enforcement needs and sacrifice Fourth Amendment 
privacy rights not to combat terrorism, per se, but to make investigation of ordinary crimes 
easier and more efficient, which in turn will free up more officers to deal specifically with 
terrorism). 
 203. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (noting the Court in Mendenhall found 
that the defendant consented to a search, and thus did not have to employ drug war rhetoric 
to loosen the “reasonable suspicion” standard at this time). 
 204. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991); see also James M. Sokolowski, 
Government Drug Testing:   A Question of Reasonableness, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1343-
44 (1990) (noting that the prevailing public perception in the late 1980’s was that drug use 
was an evil that needed to be stopped, even if it meant a great expenditure of public 
resources and a loss of personal liberties). 
 205. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2457-61 (analyzing both the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment challenges to Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute). 
 206. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2485. 
 207. Id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 208. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (pointing out that the majority does not 
provide any evidence to show that knowing a person’s identity or criminal record will better 
protect the officer’s safety). 
 209. See Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2460, 2461 (deeming a name a 
“commonsense inquiry” and “insignificant”).  The Court failed entirely to support these 
statements.  Id.  See generally Shaun B. Spencer, Vantage Point:   Nevada Case Threatens 
to Expand Terry Stops, 48 B.B.J. 27, 28 (2004) (citing cases that recognize privacy and 
anonymity interests in a name, such as McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 
341-42 (1995) and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958)).  The article contends 
that to accept the Court’s argument that a name is an insignificant fact would in effect allow 
police to stop anyone and demand identification.  Id. 
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dissent, Justice O’Connor warns that “the greatest threats to our 
constitutional freedoms come in times of crisis.”210  She adds that the only 
way for the Court to evaluate the conflict between a government interest 
and its intrusion on privacy rights is to “stay close to the record in each 
case that appears before them, and make their judgments based on that 
alone.”211 
It is evident that on its face, the Hiibel majority attempted to heed 
O’Connor’s words, however, underlying agendas likely played a role. 
Hiibel is similar to many of the drug war cases, where the prevention of 
drug use was sufficiently important to justify government interests and 
curtail privacy rights.212 In Hiibel, the hidden assumption seemed to be that 
the potential for a suspect to be a terrorist is sufficient to justify compelled 
identification, and that this interest outweighs an individual’s right to 
privacy.  This assumption, which is inconsistent with the objective 
balancing approach213 prescribed in Terry, preordains the outcome of future 
Fourth Amendment cases involving terrorism. 
Justice Stevens hinted at this notion in his dissent.214  He maintained that 
in Hiibel, the defendant’s refusal to cooperate did not impede the police 
investigation into whether an assault took place, which raised the question 
of why the government interest was so important.215  Instead, he observed 
that the Nevada “stop and identify” statute fully intended to provide police 
officers with an additional “useful law enforcement tool.”216  It is 
significant that the utility of this tool, until the war on terrorism became a 
focal point of government policy, was not apparent to the Court.217 
IV.  RECOMMENDATION 
If the Court aims to give police more authority in light of the war on 
terrorism, it should narrowly tailor the scope of this new power so that it 
                                                 
 210. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 686 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Supra Part III.B. 
 213. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2461-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Court’s holding, [Nevada’s stop and identify] statute requires nothing more than a useless 
invasion of privacy”). 
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 217. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (listing past cases in which the Court had 
a chance to uphold various states’ “stop and identify” statutes, but instead found them to be 
unconstitutional).  In those cases the Court deemed the statutes too vague because they 
requested “identification” in general, which the Court said was unclear to both police and 
potential suspects.  Supra note 61.  However, the Nevada statute is no different; while it 
outwardly allows police to request just a name, it is apparent that with computer databases, a 
name can lead to the same information that an officer would get if they asked for 
identification.  See supra Part II.B (discussing the various computer databases available to 
officers and information they can obtain from inputting a suspect’s name). 
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serves government interests without curtailing civil liberties.  Hiibel’s 
creation of a bright line rule contradicts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
which has “consistently eschewed” such rules and instead advocated for a 
case-by-case approach.218  The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure depends on the totality of the 
circumstances and is intensely fact-specific.219  Despite this position, critics 
suggest that the Court has been too quick to adopt bright line rules in the 
Fourth Amendment context in an effort to offer more guidance to law 
enforcement officials.220 
It is clear that apprehending terrorists serves an important government 
interest, especially in post-September 11 America.221  Thus, if police have a 
valid reasonable suspicion that someone is a wanted felon or terrorist, then 
having the authority to run their name through a computer database may be 
valuable.222  However, to apply this tactic to ordinary police encounters, 
where learning a suspect’s name has nothing to do with investigating the 
crime at hand, unnecessarily infringes on privacy rights, upends precedent, 
and ensures that the Fourth Amendment will continue to lose its identity. 
CONCLUSION 
In validating Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute, a sharply divided 
Supreme Court decided that relinquishing one’s name on police demand is 
a minor indignity, if officers have reasonable suspicion to stop that person 
in the first place.223  And in the vast majority of situations, this is probably 
true.  However, when the Court curtails Fourth Amendment protections, 
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even a little, it walks the proverbial slippery slope224 toward whittling away 
individual privacy rights, as Justice Breyer alluded to in his Hiibel 
dissent.225  Although the Court left open the possibility of future as-applied 
challenges to compelled identification under the Fifth Amendment, such 
challenges are unlikely to succeed.226 
Moreover, history has suggested that when the Court diminishes privacy 
rights, it is often poor and minority populations who suffer the most.227  For 
those who treasure the integrity of the justice system, trends that infringe 
on privacy rights, even if only for a small number of people, must be 
viewed with trepidation. 
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(defining “slippery slope” as an argumentative claim that “a particular act, seemingly 
innocuous when taken in isolation, may yet lead to a future host of similar but increasingly 
pernicious events”). 
 225. Hiibel, 542 U.S. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2464-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 226. See id. at __, 124 S. Ct. at 2461; see also Leading Cases:   Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments—Stop and Identify Statutes, 118 HARV. L. REV. 286, 292-96 (2004) (noting “it 
is hard to imagine any plausible circumstance where” an as-applied challenge to state “stop 
and identify” statutes would succeed, and describing several scenarios that demonstrate why 
this is so). 
 227. Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 158; see Babcock, supra note 136  (suggesting that with 
the holdings of Hiibel and Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), if police see a dark-
skinned man looking around furtively, who turns and walks away, they can stop him and, 
without necessarily suspecting him of anything in particular, demand his identity and arrest 
him if he refuses to provide it); Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2161 (opining that anti-terrorism 
law enforcement efforts will inevitably target young men of Middle Eastern origin in light 
of September 11). 
